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ABSTRACT  55 
 56 
Background 57 
Accomplishing infection prevention and control (IPC) in health facilities in Sub-Saharan Africa 58 
is challenging. Due to poor IPC, health care workers (HCWs) were frequently infected during 59 
Sierra Leone’s Ebola epidemic. In late 2014, IPC was rapidly and nationally scaled-up. We 60 
carried out workshops in sampled facilities to further improve adherence to IPC. We investigated 61 
HCW experiences and observed practice gaps, before and after the workshops. 62 
 63 
Methods  64 
We conducted an uncontrolled, before and after, mixed-methods study in eight health facilities in 65 
Bo and Kenema Districts during December 2014 and January 2015. Quantitative methods 66 
administered to HCWs at baseline and follow-up included a survey on attitudes and self-efficacy 67 
toward IPC and, structured observations of behaviours. The intervention involved a workshop for 68 
HCWs to develop improvement plans for their facility. We analysed the changes between rounds 69 
in survey responses and behaviours. We used interviews to explore attitudes and self-efficacy 70 
throughout the study period. 71 
 72 
Results 73 
HCWs described IPC as “life-saving” and personal protective equipment (PPE) as uncomfortable 74 
for providers and frightening for patients. At baseline, self-efficacy was high (median=4/strongly 75 
agree). Responses reflecting unfavourable attitudes were low for glove use (median=1/strongly 76 
disagree, IQR, 1-2) and PPE use with ill family members (median=1, IQR, 1-2), and mixed for 77 
 4 
 
PPE use with ill HCWs (median=2/disagree, IQR, 1-4). Observations demonstrated consistent 78 
glove reuse and poor HCW hand-washing. The maintenance of distance [RR 1.09, 95% CI 79 
1.02—1.16] and patient hand-washing [RR 1.19, 95% CI 1.3—1.25] improved to >90%.  80 
 81 
Conclusions 82 
We found favourable attitudes toward IPC and gaps in practice. Risk perceptions of HCWs and 83 
tendencies to ration PPE where chronic supply chain issues normally lead to PPE stock outs, may 84 
affect practice. As Sierra Leone’s Ebola Recovery Strategy aims to make all facilities IPC-85 
compliant, both socio-behavioural improvements and a secure supply chain are essential. 86 
 87 
 88 
 89 
  90 
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KEY QUESTIONS 91 
 92 
What is already known about this subject? 93 
 A gross lack of adequate infection prevention and control practice in health facilities 94 
was a main driver of the Ebola virus disease epidemic in Sierra Leone.  95 
 Given the rarity of these epidemics, it is likely that infection prevention and control 96 
strategies are not frequently documented in the scientific literature, and have not 97 
undergone formal evaluation in situ.  98 
What are the new findings? 99 
 We comprehensively evaluate attitudes and self-efficacy toward infection prevention 100 
and control, and adherence to practice using the appropriate combination of 101 
qualitative, quantitative, observational and participatory approaches.  102 
 The study was carried out during the height of the national epidemic, thereby 103 
presenting a unique opportunity to examine actual health care worker behaviours and 104 
attitudes under duress, and also to inform policy and practice. 105 
Recommendations for policy 106 
 Sierra Leone’s National Recovery Plan for 2015 to 2017 has put $33 million USD 107 
toward scaling up and maintaining infection prevention and control across all health 108 
care facilities in order to prevent a recurrence of Ebola virus disease. The practice gaps 109 
identified provide the rationale to improve current training packages by providing 110 
insight into contextual, emotional, psychological and behavioural factors that influence 111 
adherence to infection prevention and control practice and, the motivations of health 112 
care workers.  113 
 114 
  115 
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INTRODUCTION  116 
 117 
Sierra Leone was profoundly impacted by the Ebola virus disease (EVD) epidemic in West 118 
Africa, documenting 14,122 cases and 3,955 deaths.[1] Its first confirmed case in May 2014 led 119 
to the initial outbreak in the eastern districts of Kailahun and Kenema. From June to December, 120 
transmission spread to all districts and peaked at 600 confirmed cases weekly.[2] The incidence 121 
among health care workers (HCWs) became 100 times that of the general population, leading to 122 
the deaths of nearly 10% of the workforce.[3, 4] 123 
 124 
Poor infection prevention and control (IPC) serves as an efficient amplifier of transmission of 125 
viral haemorrhagic fevers (VHF).[5-7] In primary health care facilities, also called peripheral 126 
health units (PHUs), HCWs lacked the supplies and training to apply rigorous symptom 127 
screening and IPC practices recommended for Ebola treatment units (ETU).[8] Such deficits 128 
increased the risk of occupational and nosocomial infection for HCWs and non-EVD patients, 129 
respectively. The majority (66%) of HCW infections occurred in PHUs and hospitals.[4] As 130 
HCWs became infected, colleagues became frightened and demoralized, and the community’s 131 
trust of the health system was further eroded.[9] 132 
 133 
By August, grossly insufficient IPC led to the infection of 43 HCWs in Kenema district, mainly 134 
in Kenema Government Hospital, which had become a de facto ETU.[3, 10] To prevent EVD 135 
transmission in PHUs, the International Rescue Committee (IRC), WHO, and Kenema’s District 136 
Health Management Team provided IPC supplies including light personal protective equipment 137 
(PPE), and training to Kenema’s PHUs near the peak of the district’s outbreak in August 2014. 138 
The training covered screening, isolation, referral, hand hygiene, use of light PPE, sharps 139 
management, environmental cleaning, and waste disposal.[11, 12]
 
The epidemic continued to 140 
spread rapidly and geographically. Nearly all PHUs remained open, albeit with substantially 141 
reduced staffing and services.[13] A rapid assessment of PHUs in six districts found deficiencies 142 
in the identification and isolation of suspected cases, scarcity of supplies (PPE, chlorine, water 143 
and incinerators) and delays in referral of suspected cases to ETUs.[14] This led the Ministry of 144 
Health and Sanitation, the IRC-led Ebola Response Consortium, UNICEF, and the US Centers 145 
for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) to train HCWs in IPC in all 1,180 PHUs across 14 146 
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districts nationally, between October and December 2014.[12, 15]  The effort was paired with a 147 
quality assurance program to monitor inventory, structures, and practices on an ongoing basis. 148 
To learn from this experience and evaluate attitudes, experiences and the effects of an 149 
improvement workshop on behaviours, we conducted a mixed-methods study with multiple 150 
objectives. The primary objective was to generate insights on how IPC behaviours can be 151 
improved in a short time frame during an EVD outbreak. A secondary objective was to assess 152 
HCW attitudes, self-efficacy, and experiences with IPC practice. Another secondary objective 153 
was to evaluate the effectiveness of participatory workshops to develop improvement plans, 154 
through the measurement of changes in adherence to IPC protocols. The primary outcome 155 
measures of effectiveness were the proportion of correct IPC behaviours within the domains of 156 
pre-screening, donning, screening, doffing and consultation. 157 
 158 
METHODS  159 
 160 
Study design, setting and participants  161 
 162 
Using a participatory action framework and a mixed methods approach, we conducted a single 163 
group, pre-test post-test study (also called an uncontrolled before and after intervention study) in 164 
Bo and Kenema Districts in December 2014 and January 2015.[16, 17] The districts were at 165 
different phases of the epidemic. In Kenema, the epidemic had peaked, and by December there 166 
were fewer than two cases per week. Bo’s first cases were reported in July 2014, and by 167 
December, transmission dropped from 20-40 cases to 10 cases per week. The national IPC 168 
trainings led by the Ministry of Health and Sanitation and the Ebola Response Consortium were 169 
completed approximately one week before the data collection for this study began in December 170 
2014.   171 
 172 
There were two phases of the study where data were collected: a baseline period (December 10-173 
20, 2014) and a follow-up period three weeks later (January 7 to 16, 2015). The study’s 174 
intervention consisted of a participatory workshop in each district immediately following the 175 
baseline period and attended by HCWs, district health officials, community health officers 176 
(CHOs, who are main health care provider at the PHU level) and community representatives. At 177 
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this workshop, participants reviewed baseline data on IPC practices, attitudes and risk perception 178 
and they developed improvement plans for each PHU. At baseline and follow-up, we conducted 179 
self-administered surveys with HCWs exposed to the intervention and who were present at the 180 
PHUs to assess demographics, attitudes, and self-efficacy toward IPC. Also, at baseline and 181 
follow-up, we measured HCW’s adherence to IPC protocols using structured observations of 182 
patient encounters. During both periods, in-depth interviews (IDI) were conducted to explore 183 
attitudes and self-efficacy toward IPC and, experiences with IPC (without attempts to compare 184 
periods). This included vignettes wherein HCWs were asked how they would act in three 185 
situations related to IPC in their professional and personal lives. 186 
 187 
We used stratified random sampling to select PHUs from a sampling frame of 121 PHUs in 188 
Kenema and of 110 PHUs in Bo district. We stratified by urban/rural setting and any/no 189 
suspected cases at the PHU level, to maximize variation. One facility was randomly chosen from 190 
each stratum in each district resulting in a total of eight participating PHUs. At least four HCWs 191 
across a range of roles were included in the IDIs at each facility, as most facilities had no more 192 
than four staff. This formed the purposive sample for the survey. Sample sizes for the 193 
observations were not calculated a priori due to the fact that observers could be present in PHUs 194 
for a limited time period and therefore could capture a limited number of observations. A 195 
timeline of the methods is presented in Figure 1. 196 
 197 
Figure 1. Timeline of the methods 198 
 199 
 200 
 201 
 202 
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Data collection and measurement  203 
 204 
Two observers and eight qualitative interviewers per district were trained for two and three days, 205 
respectively. Three co-investigators trained the interviewers and supervised data collection (LH, 206 
RA, HB). Research tools were piloted in PHUs that were not selected for study. The survey was 207 
self-administered to the HCWs available on that day. For the structured observations, teams of 208 
two observers watched HCW-patient encounters for five hours on a single day at each PHU. 209 
Behaviours were recorded for each domain in the national protocol (patient screening, donning 210 
and doffing of PPE, patient consultation, isolation of patients screened positive, donning and 211 
doffing of PPE for isolation, and dead body management).[11] Data were collected with 212 
smartphones using Magpi software (Datadyne, Washington, D.C.). If a behaviour was clearly a 213 
hazard (i.e., HCW attempts to touch the patient without gloves), observers were instructed to 214 
intervene. IDIs were conducted in Krio and Mende by one supervisor and three interviewers per 215 
district, digitally recorded and typed verbatim in Krio or Mende. They lasted 30 to 60 minutes. 216 
The transcripts were translated from Krio and Mende to English. 217 
 218 
Data analysis 219 
 220 
Data were analyzed and interpreted concurrently using a convergent-parallel design to integrate 221 
findings across methods.[18] Quantitative analysis of the survey and structured observations was 222 
conducted using Stata 14 (StataCorp LP, College Station, TX). For the survey, responses on a 223 
four-point Likert item scale were summarized using the median and the interquartile range 224 
(IQR). Since HCWs were selected based on their availability, some HCWs may have changed 225 
between rounds. Since pairing was not possible, distributions of responses at baseline and at 226 
follow-up were compared using the Wilcoxon rank-sum test. For the structured observations, the 227 
proportion of correct behaviours for each task and the changes between rounds were computed. 228 
The main exposure and outcome were the time period (baseline versus follow-up) and the 229 
proportion of correct behaviours, respectively. A log-binomial model was used to estimate risk 230 
ratios (RR) for each correct behaviour at baseline and follow-up. Generalised estimating 231 
equations (GEE) with robust standard errors accounted for repeated measures amongst HCWs 232 
and clustering within PHUs.[19] An exchangeable working correlation structure was assumed. 233 
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For all statistical tests, a significance level of p < 0.05 was chosen. For the qualitative 234 
components, an initial phase of inductive coding on a selection of rich, diverse, and 235 
representative transcripts was done based in part on Grounded Theory.[20] Coding and analysis 236 
were conducted using Dedoose 5.011 (SocioCultural Research Consultants, LLC, Los Angeles, 237 
CA).  238 
 239 
Ethics 240 
 241 
The study received ethical approval from Durham University’s Institutional Review Board and 242 
the Sierra Leone Ethics and Scientific Research Committee. HCWs provided written informed 243 
consent. If any potentially hazardous behaviours were observed, observers were required to 244 
intervene immediately through a verbal notification to the HCW. 245 
 246 
RESULTS  247 
 248 
The survey was administered to 35 HCWs at baseline and 33 HCWs at follow-up in eight PHUs 249 
(Table 1). Twenty-two (63%) of the 35 HCWs were the same between rounds, based on 250 
profession, age and sex. There were no confirmed cases among HCWs in the sampled PHUs 251 
during the study period. Participants included community health officers (CHO), community 252 
health nurses (CHN), maternal child health aides (MCHA) and community health assistants 253 
(CHA). Half were below 40 years of age, and half were female. The majority (77%) were trained 254 
through the national IPC training and 43% had already screened patients. In total, 54 IDIs were 255 
analysed. Three recordings were lost, but saturation had been reached before completion of the 256 
available transcripts. All field notes were reviewed to ensure no new themes emerged.  257 
 258 
 259 
 260 
 261 
 262 
 263 
 264 
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 265 
Table 1. Characteristics of survey participants, baseline (N=35) 266 
 267 
 268 
 269 
 270 
 271 
 272 
 273 
 274 
 275 
 276 
 277 
 278 
 279 
*Missing data for n=2 (age), n=1 (profession), n=4 (training); IPC = infection prevention and control 280 
 281 
Implementation of the workshop intervention 282 
 283 
Each district conducted a daylong workshop. HCWs, health authorities, and community 284 
members identified key themes in the data. They developed causal diagrams and matrices, to link 285 
IPC challenges to potential solutions, and improvement plans for each PHU that aimed to 286 
improve IPC within three weeks (Table 2). Solutions ranged from specific and attainable (e.g., 287 
obtaining PPE for safe deliveries) to broad and more distal (e.g., improving the water supply). 288 
Due to the competing priorities of the emergency response, improvement plans were not always 289 
completed within three weeks.   290 
  291 
Characteristic N (%) 
Sex, male 14 (40) 
Age* 
<30 
30-39 
40-49 
50+ 
 
8 (23) 
11 (31) 
11 (31) 
3 (8) 
Profession* 
Community health nurse 
Maternal child health aide 
Community health assistant  
Community health officer 
Community health worker 
Endemic disease control unit assistant 
Laboratory technician  
Other 
 
11 (31) 
9 (26) 
4 (11) 
3 (9) 
1 (3) 
1 (3) 
1 (3) 
4 (11) 
Workplace 
Community health post 
Community health centre 
Maternal and child health post 
 
17 (49) 
 16 (46) 
 2 (6) 
District 
Bo 
Kenema 
 
16 (46) 
19 (54) 
Trained in national IPC program* 27 (77) 
Screened patients in past six months 15 (43) 
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Table 2. Key IPC challenges and solutions outlined by workshop participants in action 292 
plans 293 
Problem Potential solution  Frequency, n=8 (%) 
Lack plan and physical materials for screening 
booth 
Build screening materials or booth 7 (88) 
Lack plan/materials for deliveries Procure elbow gloves, delivery aprons etc. 4 (50) 
No latrines for suspect cases Build a dedicated latrine 4 (50) 
Routine care requires contact  Obtain an electronic blood pressure machine 4 (50) 
Community members do not understand 
rationale for IPC  
Increase community sensitization on IPC and hand 
washing 
3 (38) 
Hand washing among staff and patients is poor Reinforce hand washing through signage;  
increase soap supply  
3 (38) 
Lack a working incinerator Build an incinerator or burning pit 3 (38) 
Lack an isolation area Build an isolation area 3 (38) 
Lack fencing for facility Put in fencing 3 (38) 
Water supply is inconsistent Increase the supply of water 3 (38) 
Need to reinforce supervision, training or 
mentorship for IPC 
Implement IPC supervision or peer mentoring 2 (25) 
Lack space for women post-delivery  Obtain mattresses for post-natal care 2 (25) 
Concerned PPE will run out Ensure additional PPE is available 1 (13) 
Electricity is inconsistent Address generator problems 1 (13) 
Lack safe area for PPE removal Make space for a PPE removal area 1 (13) 
*IPC=Infection prevention and control; HCW=Health care worker; PPE=Personal Protective Equipment 294 
 295 
Risk perception, attitudes, and self-efficacy 296 
 297 
Survey results did not change significantly between rounds; we report the baseline results in the 298 
text and the full results in Table 3. Respondents believed they had an increased risk of infection 299 
compared to the public (median = 4 [strongly agree], interquartile range, 3-4). There was slight 300 
disagreement with the false statement that children posed a lesser risk of transmission as adults 301 
(median = 2 [disagree], interquartile range, 2-3). HCWs described difficulty in recognising how 302 
the risks of infection for EVD and other diseases differed. As EVD was described as an 303 
epidemic, “it would not last for long and that maybe after one or two months it will all be over 304 
and gone" (Female state enrolled nurse, Bo). When asked if they would avoid the use of gloves 305 
to treat “non-Ebola” patients and PPE to treat family members for any condition, HCWs 306 
indicated strong disagreement with these statements (median = 1 [strongly disagree], 307 
interquartile range, 1-2).  308 
 309 
 310 
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Table 3. Self-efficacy, risk perception and attitudes among HCWs  311 
 Overall   Bo  Kenema  
 
 
No. of respondents 
Baseline 
 
35 
Follow-up 
 
33 
 Baseline 
 
16 
Follow-up 
 
16 
Baseline 
 
19 
Follow-up 
 
17 
 Median+ 
(IQR) 
Median 
(IQR) 
P-value* Median 
(IQR) 
Median 
(IQR) 
Median 
(IQR) 
Median 
(IQR) 
Self-efficacy        
I can correctly identify suspected 
Ebola cases using the screening 
flowchart. 
4 (3-4) 3 (3-4) 0.35 4 (3-4) 4 (3-4) 4 (3-4) 4 (3-4) 
I can remove PPE after isolating a 
suspected Ebola case without 
infecting myself. 
4 (3-4) 3 (3-4) 0.52 4 (3-4) 3 (3-4) 4 (3-4) 3 (3-4) 
I can safely disinfect a room where 
a suspected Ebola case has been 
isolated to remove any risk of 
infection to myself or other. 
4 (3-4) 4 (3-4) 0.25 4 (3-4) 4 (3-4) 4 (3-4) 3 (3-4) 
There is enough PPE at my facility 
to protect us from being infected 
with Ebola 
4 (3-4) 3 (2-4) 0.21 3 (3-4) 3 (2-4) 4 (3-4) 4 (3-4) 
 
Attitudes and risk perception 
       
I am at higher risk of becoming 
infected with Ebola because I work 
in a health facility 
4 (3-4) 4 (3-4) 0.51 4 (3-4) 4 (3-4) 4 (3-4) 4 (3-4) 
I am less likely to become infected 
with Ebola when taking care of 
children than adults 
2 (2-3) 2 (1-3) 0.87 2 (2-3) 2 (2-4) 2 (1-2) 2 (1-3) 
If my colleague is sick it would be 
cruel to use PPE when treating 
him/her 
2 (1-4) 1 (1-3) 0.4 2 (1-4) 1 (1-2) 2 (1-4) 2 (1-4) 
I do not need to use PPE when 
taking care of a family member 
with a fever, headache, diarrhoea, 
and nausea 
1 (1-2) 1 (1-2) 0.87 1 (1-2) 1 (1-2) 1 (1-4) 1 (1-2) 
I do not need to wear gloves when I 
take care of non-Ebola patients 
1 (1-2) 2 (1-2) 0.29 1 (1-2) 1 (1-2) 2 (1-2) 2 (1-2) 
+ Responses were given on a 4-point Likert item scale from strongly disagree [1] to strongly agree [4]; HCW= Health care worker; IQR = 312 
Interquartile range; PPE=Personal Protective Equipment; *Evaluated using the Wilcoxon rank-sum test. 313 
 314 
HCWs described PPE as uncomfortable, hot, and causing sweating and itching, yet at the same 315 
time, “precious, lifesaving, necessary for protecting oneself and one’s family.” On balance, “it’s 316 
better that you overheat but are protected than that you get fresh air and become contaminated. I 317 
choose to be hot but protected” (Female CHO, Bo). A recurrent theme was that HCWs regretted 318 
the physical distance with their patients caused by PPE. There was disagreement among HCWs 319 
regarding the statement, “it would be cruel to use PPE when treating a sick colleague” (median = 320 
2 [disagree], interquartile range, 1-4) (Table 3). However, a vignette to elicit perspectives on the 321 
management of an ill HCW suggested correct behaviours. HCWs most often reported that they 322 
would tell an infected colleague to isolate herself (“put her in observation”, “don’t touch her”, 323 
“tell her not to touch anybody”) or they would refer her to an ETU (“call the emergency line,” 324 
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“get that ambulance to take her away,” “encourage her with kind words while she is being 325 
referred”). While acknowledging that it would be an upsetting experience (“she will feel the 326 
stigma of the Ebola, she will be shedding tears, as will we”), most insisted on isolating or using 327 
PPE to treat her: “She is my colleague and friend and when the Ebola finishes…I will apologize 328 
to her, but (for now) I will not touch her, I won’t do it, before all of us die, let one die so that 329 
others can live.”  (Female MCHA, Kenema) 330 
 331 
Most HCWs expressed self-efficacy in identifying cases, removing PPE, and disinfecting a room 332 
after identification of a suspected case (see, Table 3). HCWs described five prevailing emotions 333 
that influenced the maintenance of care: disbelief, dread, fear, sadness and determination. Fear 334 
was described with the most depth and nuance, followed by sadness. Their self-efficacy 335 
developed after a gradual acceptance of the threat and after receiving training, supplies and 336 
undergoing practice. HCWs described how their own attitude or knowledge has changed after the 337 
training saying, for instance, “Now I feel like I have to be careful in everything I do” (Female 338 
CHN Bo). Several HCWs, particularly those engaged in childbirth, described discontinuing work 339 
at the outset, but resuming services with confidence once they received training and PPE stocks: 340 
 341 
“Let me say the truth, before Ebola, we were working hard but we were careless in terms 342 
of IPC. As for me, the only time I used to wear gloves was during delivery…the use of 343 
chlorine for hand washing was not common…We had no idea about the use of wearing of 344 
goggles, facemasks, PPE and gowns…Now with the epidemic of Ebola, hand washing is 345 
widely practiced.” (Female MCHA, Kenema) 346 
 347 
Most HCWs mentioned that for their IPC to be effective, community sensitization was essential. 348 
PPE induced fear among patients, evoking images of burial teams and “memories of brothers and 349 
sisters taken by Ebola” and “buried by these people.” Sensitization by HCWs was reportedly 350 
impeded by restrictions on their movement, inaccessibility of communities, finances and a 351 
resistance from community members:  352 
 353 
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“They are really been panicked to come…they will stand at the gate and start to talk to 354 
themselves in fear of the booths that we have constructed. But we are still sensitizing 355 
them to continue coming”. (Female MCHA, Kenema) 356 
 357 
HCWs tried to counteract patients’ fears by counselling them individually to understand the 358 
rationale behind the use of PPE: 359 
 360 
“When the patients come, they sit down. Before we start our work, we talk to them, 361 
“Now, you see me as I am, I am alright. I am going to dress in order to protect myself, 362 
and protect you. May be I am sick but you are not aware. I would be talking to you may 363 
be the spit from my mouth jumps to your face or whatsoever or your nose or your eye 364 
being that they are closer to me, if I had the disease, you will have it. Or in case I am 365 
asking you questions then your child throws up or coughs, I will be infected. So for this 366 
reason I am going to put on these dressings. Don’t see me and be afraid. I am trying to 367 
protect myself and protect you so that I won’t infect you and you also will not infect me.” 368 
(Male MCHA, Bo) 369 
 370 
HCWs mentioned three further threats to self-efficacy. First, HCWs doubted the differential 371 
diagnosis for suspect cases: “typhoid…malaria…Lassa have signs of Ebola” (Female CHO, Bo). 372 
Second, respondents at follow-up remained concerned about PPE shortages (median = 3 [agree], 373 
interquartile range, 2-3). Third, HCWs emphasized that while conducting IPC, they continued to 374 
deal with a disrupted health system:  375 
 376 
“There is no toilet, no water well, no network coverage, no means of transportation… 377 
these are our problems. … And you tell a person to wash their hands at the facility, but 378 
this is not easy without water”. (HCW, Bo)  379 
 380 
Adherence to IPC behaviours 381 
 382 
The proportions of correct behaviours and RRs comparing the proportion of correct behaviours 383 
between baseline (90 screenings and 54 consultations) and follow-up (131 screenings and 32 384 
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consultations) are shown in Table 4 (see annex [Final annex_ratnayake.pdf ] for results stratified 385 
by district). No suspected cases or dead bodies were observed, therefore all observations relate to 386 
the screening of patients and subsequent consultations. During pre-screenings, only one instance 387 
of HCW hand washing was observed. The proportion of HCWs asking patients to wash their 388 
hands (RR 1.45, 95% CI 1.16—1.8) and patients doing so upon prompting from the HCW (1.49, 389 
1.19—1.86) increased. Patient hand washing, with or without HCW prompting, increased though 390 
not significantly from 82% to 99% (RR 1.21, 95% CI 0.95—1.71). HCWs frequently mentioned 391 
patient hand washing as straining on the HCW-patient relationship: 392 
 393 
“....when they come and you tell them to wash their hands, they make comments like, 394 
'What about [you], do you wash your hands every day?' ... the concept that behaviour 395 
should be changed, it is not really easy, it is difficult”. (Female CHO, Kenema)  396 
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Table 4. Proportions of correct IPC events before and after the workshop  397 
 398 
 399 
 400 
 401 
 402 
 403 
 404 
  405 
 406 
 407 
 408 
 409 
 410 
 411 
 412 
 413 
 414 
 415 
 
416 
 417 
 
418 
 419 
 420 
 421 
+Risk ratio using binomial regression (family: binomial, link: log) accounting for clustering at the health facility level (GEE). Hyphens indicate 422 
where parameter was not estimable. *Indicates a Poisson regression (family: poisson, link: log) was used due to the failure of the binomial model 423 
to converge. HCW= Health care worker. 424 
 425 
HCWs wore boots and face masks more than 60% of the time at baseline and more than 80% at 426 
follow-up (boots, RR 1.51, 95% CI 1.14—1.99; face-masks, RR 1.27, 95% CI 1.03—1.58). 427 
Donning in the correct order increased ninefold from baseline (3%) to follow-up (56%) (RR 428 
8.94, 95% CI 0.84—95.61). In 20% of screenings at follow-up, additional HCWs were present in 429 
the screening area (which is not recommended; RR 0.86, 95% CI 0.69—1.07). Virtually all 430 
 Baseline   
n=90 
Follow-up    
n=131 
 
 
Pre-screening Correct % Correct % RR+ 95% CI 
Patient went directly, or HCW 
directed patient, to screening area  
51 57 31 24 0.53 0.37—0.77 
Attendant washed hands 1 1 0 0 - - 
Screener asked patient to wash hands 56 62 105 80 1.45 1.16—1.80 
Patient washed hands upon direction 
from HCW 
54 60 105 80 1.49 1.19—1.86 
Patient washed hands directly or 
washed upon direction from HCW 
74 82 130 99 1.27 0.95—1.71* 
 
Donning 
      
Wore rubber boots or covers 60 67 111 85 1.51 1.14—1.99 
Wore face shield or mask 69 77 109 83 1.27 1.03—1.58 
Completed in correct order 3 3 73 56 8.94 0.84—95.61 
Took off /did not wear jewelry 89 99 114 87 0.83 0.72—0.97 
Wore new gloves 17 19 40 31 2.56 1.37—4.79 
Continued to wear gloves 63 70 87 66 0.75 0.6—0.94 
 
Screening 
      
No other HCWs were in screening 
area 
86 96 104 79 0.86 0.69—1.07* 
Stood 1.5 meters from patient 82 91 130 99 1.11 0.83—1.48* 
Sat sideways to patient 21 23 75 57 2.3 1.34—3.95 
Held digital thermometer 5-6 cm from 
patient 
82 91 15 12 0.23 0.12—0.43* 
 
Doffing 
      
Removed any light PPE 13 14 42 32 2.54 1.32—4.88 
Removed gloves 9 10 29 22 4.09 1.34—12.49 
Washed gloved or ungloved hands 10 11 25 19 2.58 1.0—6.66 
Removed face shield or goggles 8 9 2 2 0.21 0.05—0.94 
Completed in correct order  
(if removed gloves)  
3 3 29 22 6.64 2.09—21.14 
       
 Baseline 
n=54 
 Follow-up 
n=32 
   
Consultations Correct % Correct % RR+                     95% CI 
Washed hands before treating patient 8 15 3 10 0.63 0.18—2.21 
Washed hands after treating patient 21 39 5 16 0.91 0.5—1.65 
Put on new gloves before treating 
patient 
50 93 29 91 0.97 0.85—1.1 
Did not remove gloves after treating 
patient 
6 11 8 25 1.51 0.55—4.12 
Stood 1.5 meters from patient 35 65 29 91 1.18 0.92—1.51 
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HCWs stood 1.5 meters from patients, increasing from 91% to 99% at follow-up (RR 1.11, 95% 431 
CI 0.83—1.48). Twice as many HCWs sat sideways toward patients to avoid bodily fluids (23% 432 
vs. 57%, RR 2.3, 95% CI 1.34—3.95). There was a marked decrease from 91% to 12% of HCWs 433 
holding thermometers at the recommended distance of 5 to 6 cm from patients (RR 0.23, 95% CI 434 
0.12-0.43). Across rounds, the temperature check was applied without questioning for symptoms 435 
and risk factors if afebrile. In no case did a screener ask a patient about all symptoms and risk 436 
factors. HCWs described questioning as necessary to “determine the [epidemiological] link” for 437 
case identification. Still, questioning patients was not viewed as particularly effective because 438 
individuals could “deny and hide the (link)”.  439 
 440 
Some differences between baseline and follow-up regarding the doffing procedure were 441 
significant, including removing light PPE and gloves (light PPE, RR 2.54, 95% CI 1.32—4.88 442 
and gloves, RR 4.09, 95% CI 1.34—12.49) and completion in correct order (RR 6.64, 95% CI 443 
2.09-21.14). Doffing was compromised by the fact that a low proportion of HCWs removed PPE 444 
between screenings (14% at baseline and 32% at follow-up). Proportions of glove removal post-445 
screening increased, but remained low (10% at baseline, 22% at follow up). This was 446 
accompanied by a lack of hand washing of gloved or ungloved hands between screenings (11% 447 
at baseline, 19% at follow-up). HCWs expressed concern about PPE stock-outs, as well as the 448 
strain on incinerators that frequent glove and PPE disposal would cause. Among the 29 HCWs 449 
that removed gloves, all completed doffing in the correct order at follow-up. For consultations, 450 
low proportions of HCWs washed their hands before treating a patient (15% at baseline, 10% at 451 
follow-up) or after (39% at baseline, 16% at follow-up). Most HCWs put on a new pair of gloves 452 
at baseline (93%) and follow-up (91%) and few kept the gloves on after treating the patient. 453 
Most HCWs stayed 1.5 meters from patients (65% at baseline, 91% at follow-up). 454 
 455 
DISCUSSION  456 
 457 
The EVD epidemic could be considered an overwhelming emergency in a series of severe 458 
epidemics (shigellosis and cholera) and endemic diseases (Lassa fever) in Sierra Leone that have 459 
required rigorous IPC.[21-23] In the midst of the emergency response, we studied IPC in PHUs. 460 
This provided an exceptional opportunity to directly observe and evaluate adherence to IPC, and 461 
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to work with HCWs to improve practice and discuss in detail the determinants of practice. The 462 
conviction among HCWs that IPC is lifesaving overrides the strong physical discomfort and 463 
distance with patients that it causes. During workshops, HCWs focused on improving screening, 464 
maintaining physical distance, and encouraging patient hand washing; changes in these domains 465 
were reflected in the improvements seen in these behaviours at follow-up. Significant 466 
improvements were not consistent across behaviours, partly due to several high baseline values 467 
(>80%). While HCWs also discussed HCW hand washing, glove changing, and the questioning 468 
for symptoms and risk factors, these were poorly adhered to across rounds. 469 
 470 
Our study had important limitations. Uncontrolled before and after study designs lack a control 471 
group, thus limiting the ability to attribute changes observed to the intervention.[16] Since we 472 
had a prior belief that the workshop and IPC improvement intervention would be beneficial, we 473 
believed it would be unethical to observe IPC behaviours without intervening in a control 474 
group.[22] Due to the need to rapidly implement the study during a crisis, sample sizes of PHUs 475 
were intentionally small. The results are generalizable only to the PHUs included in the sample. 476 
The delay between the baseline and follow-up was short, though given the rapid progression of 477 
the epidemic, a study of short-term behaviour changes was warranted. The lack of pairing of 478 
HCWs between rounds is due to data collection being based on the availability of HCWs on the 479 
day of data collection rather than an explicit goal to conduct data collection on days when HCWs 480 
could be matched at follow-up. The implication of this limitation is that we cannot be sure that 481 
the all of those at follow-up were as exposed as those in the baseline. This likely leads to an 482 
underestimation of the intervention’s effect. It is notable that staffing in PHUs is limited to a 483 
small pool of HCWs, and therefore, 63% of HCWs were the same at baseline and follow-up. As 484 
well, IPC improvement plans targeted changes at the PHU level, affecting all HCWs, not just 485 
those included in the baseline. There were gaps in fully implementing and prospectively 486 
monitoring the IPC improvement plans. Instead, we investigated changes in IPC retrospectively. 487 
At least one part of the observation protocol was apparently not adequately pre-tested; we think 488 
the observations of thermometer placement at follow-up are likely specious. Transmission 489 
declined by December, limiting opportunities to assess IPC for isolation and body management; 490 
the number of HCWs observed was therefore small. Finally, HCWs who were interviewed may 491 
have been more motivated to practice IPC than those who fled during the peak of the epidemics.  492 
 20 
 
 493 
Nonetheless, quantitative and qualitative results were consistent. Attitudes toward IPC were 494 
favourable, but adherence with guidelines was markedly better for some behaviours than for 495 
others. HCWs consistently wore light PPE despite reporting persistent community fears. They 496 
described their own fear in detail, relating it to the unprecedented geographic expansion of the 497 
epidemic and the common experience of losing colleagues.[9] We interpret this fear as being a 498 
driver for some IPC protocols. It is notable that during VHF outbreaks in Uganda and 499 
Democratic Republic of Congo, HCWs cited community resistance as a major reason for not 500 
wearing PPE in health facilities.[5, 24] In contrast, PPE use in this study was high, while glove 501 
changing and hand washing among HCWs, whether gloved or ungloved, were poor. This may 502 
also reflect a gap in knowledge among HCWs about how putting on or changing gloves before 503 
making contact with patients is necessary to improve patient safety.[25, 26] As gloves are 504 
fomites, changing and washing should be universal. HCW practices may be governed by the 505 
rules of rationality in disrupted health systems under normal circumstances, where chronic 506 
supply chain issues lead to widespread stock out of PPE. Another area of uncertainty was the 507 
reported hesitation to use PPE for the management of ill colleagues. When faced with a real-life 508 
situation of an ill colleague, providers’ emotions may override their knowledge of safe practices, 509 
as seen during previous VHF epidemics.[5, 27] This presents an occupational risk for HCWs 510 
who are socially and emotionally challenged by their social group’s tendency to not use PPE for 511 
one of their own. Overall, as transmission had abated, underlying emotions and competing 512 
priorities may foster a waning adherence to IPC. 513 
 514 
Our findings reveal difficulties with screening protocols in PHUs. Identifying suspect cases 515 
before they enter the PHU is the foundation for IPC in the context of EVD.[8] Across rounds, the 516 
protocol was followed incorrectly by applying the temperature check without questioning for 517 
symptoms and risk factors if afebrile. As HCWs cited the importance of establishing 518 
epidemiologic links, one explanation for their insufficient history taking may be low confidence 519 
in the protocol’s effectiveness in detecting symptoms and epidemiological links due to patients’ 520 
assumed tendency to hide them. In PHUs, the majority of patients presenting for vaccination, 521 
antenatal care, and endemic diseases would not have been infected. Making the differential 522 
diagnosis of a suspect case relies heavily on the WHO case definition that specifies symptoms 523 
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similar to malaria and typhoid.[28] The lack of questioning may indicate that HCWs exercise 524 
pre-screening to judge whether a patient appears “well” or “ill”. Patients presenting for routine 525 
services in this study may have appeared well and HCWs may have given them a cursory 526 
temperature check without appropriately questioning for risk factors (in the absence of fever). 527 
This reliance on fever may be misguided; a cohort study of confirmed cases in a holding unit at 528 
Connaught Hospital in Freetown found a reduced sensitivity of the WHO case definition with 529 
16% of confirmed cases presenting without fever.[29]  530 
 531 
The development of IPC systems in developing countries must address several core challenges to 532 
health systems: cost, procurement, a lack of knowledge and experience with IPC and other 533 
cultural issues.[26] In addition, IPC protocols may vary as the evidence base for some practices 534 
is lacking.[30, 31] It follows that the rapid scale-up of the Ebola IPC protocol in Sierra Leone has 535 
been a singular challenge. In the wake of the epidemic, the importance of IPC in primary care 536 
settings elsewhere in West Africa is gaining recognition through efforts to systematically address 537 
IPC in health facilities such as the Efficiency and Edification project in Burkina Faso, Senegal 538 
and Côte d’Ivoire.[32] Notwithstanding the structural support and costs covered by Sierra 539 
Leone’s national IPC program, there are several opportunities to improve adherence via 540 
structural, social and behavioural interventions (Table 5).[33] First, the Ebola Response 541 
Consortium’s longitudinal post-intervention monitoring of structures, practices and supplies is 542 
necessary for identifying improvements needed and maintaining highly-specialized supervision 543 
for staff and reiterating the importance of IPC. [12, 15] Second, training needs to address more 544 
complex determinants of adherence, for example, the dual aims of hand hygiene and glove-545 
changing in addressing different circumstances for contact with bodily fluids of an Ebola patient 546 
for occupational and nosocomial transmission. Explaining that gloves must be clean to protect 547 
HCWs, and their patients, is most imperative. Generating positive peer pressure through 548 
participation by colleagues and senior managers can also be a driver for adherence to hand 549 
hygiene.[34, 35] Using this logic, a group of HCWs’ belief in IPC and their ability to perform it 550 
may be key to achieving consistency. Third, during the foundational training, HCWs should be 551 
engaged early in discussing the care of ill colleagues and the need to implement IPC without 552 
compromise. After an initial training, supportive supervision could probe and quell any doubts 553 
and assure the exhaustive screening of apparently healthy patients.[5] Fourth, as community 554 
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fears affect self-efficacy, sensitization on PPE use in PHUs should be integrated into community 555 
engagement.[6] Finally, other areas that we did not address in our study relate to the 556 
improvement of the tools of IPC which may increase HCW confidence in protocols. For 557 
instance, more research is needed to assess the effectiveness of different types of light PPE for 558 
health care settings [31, 36, 37] and on the use of rapid diagnostic tests for clinical screening to 559 
improve the overall predictive value of screening for EVD.[38-40] 560 
 561 
 Table 5. Challenges to adherence to IPC in a primary health system 562 
Major challenge 
 
How addressed in Dec 2014-Jan 2015 Potential additional solutions 
Communities are unprepared for the 
systematic use of IPC and PPE in PHUs  
HCWs sensitize community members as 
they come to PHU  
 Targeted communication campaign in 
community to set expectations 
 Counselling approaches for HCWs to 
use in screening and consultation 
HCWs may not initially believe in the high 
risk of infection    
Training to raise awareness of risks for 
HCW infection 
 Integrated IPC training in pre-service 
education curricula 
 Reinforcement of in-service IPC 
training in particular for new staff 
 Ongoing supportive supervision 
Low confidence in the identification of 
suspect cases 
Training in screening  Research on new diagnostic techniques 
(e.g., rapid diagnostic tests to increase 
sensitivity of the case definition and 
the overall effectiveness of screening)  
PPE causes separation in bond between 
HCWs and patients 
HCWs found ways to motivate patients to 
recognize them  
 Guidance for HCW to increase 
communication and bonding with 
patients    
 Regular meetings between HCW and 
health committee to discuss issues 
Discomfort while using light PPE on a routine 
basis 
Training in PPE use  Technical improvements to light PPE 
 
Poor glove changing practices 
 
 
Poor hand washing  
 
 
 
Training in PPE use 
 
 
Spot checking 
 Training that emphasizes reasoning for 
appropriate use of PPE (including risks 
of not changing gloves 
 Peer systems that emphasize changing 
of gloves 
 Monitoring for feelings of high self-
efficacy in core behaviours among 
groups of HCWs 
Fear of PPE stock-out hinder use Routine stocking of PPE  Improved supply chain  
 Training that emphasizes reasoning for 
appropriate use of PPE  
Mixed attitudes toward using PPE with 
fellow HCWs 
No specific actions known by the authors  Training that specifies HCW treatment 
scenarios and addresses doubts 
Implementation within a weak and fractured 
health system 
IPC treated as emergency response  Improved supply chain systems 
 Improved payment systems for human 
resources 
 Improved coverage of functional water 
and sanitation infrastructure 
As Sierra Leone’s recovery plan intends to make all PHUs compliant with national IPC protocol, 563 
understanding how behaviours can be optimized will be paramount in achieving this goal.[41] 564 
EVD’s re-emergence in Sierra Leone in January 2016 may have led to nosocomial transmission 565 
due to the patient’s treatment seeking at a hospital[42, 43] This underlines that the international 566 
community must continue to develop and support IPC in West Africa, in addition to surveillance 567 
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and outbreak response mechanisms, to address future epidemics.568 
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